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Utilizing Behavioral Insights              
(Without Romance) 
An Inquiry into the Choice Architecture of 
Public Decision-Making 
Adam C. Smith* 
ABSTRACT 
Behavioral economics has been employed in a number of policy applica-
tions over the last decade.  From energy requirements to tax compliance to 
consumer finance, policymakers are increasingly operating under the assump-
tion that people consistently fail to make rational choices.  While the benefit of 
this policy trend remains an open debate, behavioral economists have long ne-
glected a complementary examination of public decision-makers themselves.  
Comparison of two public agencies influenced by behavioral economics, the 
U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and U.K. Behavioural Insights 
Team, demonstrates how different institutions create divergent policy out-
comes across the two agencies in a way that cannot be accounted for without 
incorporating public choice theory.  I argue that improvement of private choice 
architecture must be accompanied by careful understanding of the public 
choice architecture in which policies are rendered if behavioral economics is 
to be a successful foundation for welfare-improving policies. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It should be no surprise to learn that humans behave in ways that are far 
from optimal.  Be it from poor planning or untoward circumstance, we rarely, 
if ever, experience the idyllic fantasy of optimality in our various day-to-day 
activities.  Or as David Byrne of the Talking Heads once sang: 
Heaven, Heaven is a place 
A place where nothing 
Nothing ever happens.1 
 
*Adam C. Smith is an Associate Professor of Economics at Johnson & Wales Univer-
sity.  The author gratefully acknowledges Susan Dudley and the George Washington 
Regulatory Studies Center for their support of this research, and to Erik Kimbrough, 
Brian Mannix, Sofie Miller, Bruce Yandle, and Todd Zywicki for helpful feedback. 
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Economists have spent decades investigating just how day-to-day choices 
can be improved.  The older welfare economics research program, for example, 
sought to improve competition in the marketplace by correcting perceived mar-
ket failures, with the intended result of reducing prices and improving product 
quality.2  The Chicago school of economics, on the other hand, tended to em-
phasize the role of fiscal policy and regulation in creating bad incentives and 
misallocating market resources.3  Smaller and smarter regulation could there-
fore unleash dormant market potential.  Despite their different orientations, 
both of these approaches rely on the canons of neoclassical price theory and 
highlight institutional factors as the source of observed shortcomings.  Individ-
uals choose optimally within the constraints produced by prevailing institu-
tions, and thus undesirable outcomes could easily be avoided by “getting the 
rules right.” 
In a different vein, starting with Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman and his 
co-author Amos Tversky, behavioral economics has exposed dozens of behav-
ioral “anomalies” through extensive laboratory investigation of behavior.4  
These anomalies constitute observed behavioral deviations from the predic-
tions of neoclassical economic theory, and behavioral economists have sought 
to explain the sources of such anomalous choices by identifying and cataloging 
a variety of cognitive limitations and psychological biases.  Building on these 
findings, behavioral economists have even begun to export their psychological 
findings into policy prescriptions.5  This research program – led by such lumi-
naries as Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein and known as behavioral law and 
economics – seeks to apply the insights gleaned from studies of human behav-
ior to improve existing institutions by designing rules to compensate for (or 
take advantage of) people’s various biases.6  Given that observed choices are 
inconsistent with neoclassical theory, behavioral economists argue that “get-
 
 1.  Heaven, GENIUS, https://genius.com/Talking-heads-heaven-lyrics (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2017).  In other words, real world observations of strictly rational behavior in 
the neoclassical sense are in the null set. 
 2. Welfare Economics, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/w/welfare_economics.asp (last visited Aug. 24, 2017). 
 3. Chicago School, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/chi-
cago_school.asp (last visited Aug. 24, 2017). 
 4. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of De-
cision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 265–77 (1979). 
 5. Not all experimentalists are enthusiastic about this application to policy.  
Vernon Smith notes that the “connective interface between rationality at the individual 
level and the market level and how institutions modulate the interface is yet to be fully 
explored and understood.”  VERNON L. SMITH, RATIONALITY IN ECONOMICS: 
CONSTRUCTIVIST AND ECOLOGICAL FORMS 155 (2008).  See also Vernon L. Smith, The 
Two Faces of Adam Smith, 65 S. ECON. J. 1 (1998), for a similar argument with respect 
to the difference between personal exchange at the individual level and impersonal ex-
change at the market level. 
 6. See Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein & John P. Balz, Choice Architecture, 
in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 428 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013). 
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ting the rules right” with respect to neoclassical decision-makers will be insuf-
ficient to generate desirable outcomes.  If people are not rational to begin with, 
in the neoclassical sense of the word, then solutions designed for rational 
agents will not necessarily lead to desired outcomes. 
Thaler et al. provide a cogent outline of how we, as observers, might con-
ceive of this dilemma.7  Their phrase “choice architecture” encapsulates the 
notion that choice itself is affected by the context in which it is made.  Provid-
ing one set of incentives elicits certain responses, even when the actor is una-
ware of how they are being affected.  Developing better choice architecture, 
defined as that which allows for optimal decision-making, could potentially 
improve choice outcomes.  While this choice architecture can be manipulated 
through a variety of means, it is often policy prescription through the public 
sector that is proposed by behavioral economists. 
This has led to the creation of several public agencies, such as the Behav-
ioural Insights Team8 in the United Kingdom and the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau9 in the United States.  Furthermore, an executive order in Sep-
tember 2015 signed by President Obama created a new Social and Behavioral 
Science Team mandated with the task of combing regulatory and other public 
activities for opportunities to improve choice architecture.10  Clearly, public 
policy guided by the insights of behavioral economics is on the rise.11 
But as Boettke et al. indicate, this framework puts the cart before the horse 
in prescribing policy purely due to anomalous behavior. 12  They show how 
behavioral approaches resemble previous efforts to curtail market activity 
based upon deviations from theoretically optimal conditions; they further argue 
that finding deviations from a theoretical optimum does not in and of itself 
justify market intervention.  A variety of obstacles lie in the way between the-
ory and practice.  Coordination failures, third-party influence (or intervention), 
poor institutions, corruption, and simple unknowns all represent realistic con-
siderations that any policymaker must anticipate.13  Without understanding the 
nested context in which their insights will be embedded, theorists risk encour-
aging activity that little resembles what they are after. 
 
 7. See id. 
 8. BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TEAM, http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/ (last vis-
ited Aug. 24, 2017). 
 9. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2017). 
 10. Exec. Order No. 13,707, 80 Fed. Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 15, 2015). 
 11. Wright makes much the same observation in response to the development of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, offering that its creation represented a “me-
teoric emergence in the legislative and regulatory spheres” of behavioral influence.  See 
Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War 
with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2231 (2012). 
 12. Peter Boettke, W. Zachary Caceres & Adam Martin, Error is Obvious, Coor-
dination is the Puzzle, in HAYEK AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 90, 91 (Roger Frantz 
& Robert Leeson eds., 2013). 
 13. See id. at 92. 
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These considerations revolve around the idea that public actors them-
selves act within a certain choice architecture, which can very well interfere 
with improving market outcomes.  Thus, there is a “public choice architecture” 
to be considered alongside the “private choice architecture” that is the focus of 
behavioral law and economics.14  Put another way, behavioral economists can-
not assume away the burdens of the political process.  Desiring a simple, clean 
application of behavioral insights and attaining this through the political pro-
cess are two very different things.  Or as Mullane and Sheffrin put it, “It is 
typically easier to draw conclusions as to what behavioral tendencies caused 
policies to have certain outcomes than to demonstrate that these behavioral 
tendencies can be effectively used to create desired outcomes through their 
implementation in policy design.”15 
This Article addresses this tension by organizing how we might conceive 
of improving choices through behavioral-minded policy while incorporating 
standard public choice considerations.  Public choice economists have argued 
for decades that political actors are susceptible to incentives just like the rest 
of us, and as the public choice program has emphasized, in some cases, these 
incentives cause political decision-makers to act against the public interest.16  
What seems implicit in many behavioral policy proposals is that either (1) the 
regulators are not themselves subject to the limitations and biases they aim to 
combat or (2) that knowledge of the biases will be sufficient to mute their ef-
fects.17  The first assumption is surely unjustified, and as for the second, in-
forming regulators about their own behavioral biases will do little if not aligned 
with the proper institutional incentives.  After all, if people are prone to bias in 
their own lives, it is safe to assume that people will be equally, if not more, 
prone to bias when dealing in other people’s lives. 
Let us be clear.  To the extent that behavioral economics identifies con-
sistent and predictable patterns in the way individuals make their decisions, it 
offers the theoretical potential to improve decision-making and policy out-
comes by tailoring policies and institutions to human psychology.  In addition, 
President Obama’s executive order now makes behavioral considerations the 
law of the land in guiding regulatory policy in the United States.18  Neverthe-
less, successful implementation of any policy prescription requires a detailed 
knowledge of the existing political and market institutions and the resulting 
 
 14. See Adam C. Smith, (Mis)Application of Behavioral Economics to Regula-
tion: The Importance of Public Choice Architecture, 13 ENGAGE 11 (2012) for an ear-
lier presentation of “public choice architecture.” 
 15. Maggie Mullane & Steven Sheffrin, Regulatory Nudges in Practice 1–2 
(Tulane U. Dep’t of Econ. and Murphy Inst., White Paper, 2012), http://mur-
phy.tulane.edu/files/events/Regulatory_Nudges_mullane_sheffrin.pdf 
 16. See ADAM SMITH & BRUCE YANDLE, BOOTLEGGERS AND BAPTISTS: HOW 
ECONOMIC FORCES AND MORAL PERSUASION INTERACT TO SHAPE REGULATORY 
POLITICS (2014). 
 17. Niclas Berggren, Time for Behavioral Political Economy? An Analysis of Ar-
ticles in Behavioral Economics, 25 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 199, 200 (2012). 
 18. Exec. Order No. 13,707, 80 Fed. Reg. 56,365 (Sept. 15, 2015). 
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incentive structure through which any behavioral remedy would ultimately 
have to pass.  Hence, careful consideration of the accompanying public choice 
architecture is surely warranted. 
This Article is organized as follows.  I first present the behavioral ap-
proach as a means to overcome so-called “behavioral market failures.”  I then 
justify the need for public choice underpinnings to behavioral policies if these 
failures are to be addressed in practice.  I show how consideration of political 
institutions, a crucial component to any policy prescription, has largely been 
left to others, as behavioral economists focus on correcting biases in an insti-
tution-less vacuum.  Using the contributions of James Buchanan and Elinor 
Ostrom, I then argue that public choice insights can add to behavioral policy 
initiatives and further show that without these public choice guidelines, behav-
ioral policies are unlikely to attain the desired ends of behavioral theorists.  I 
demonstrate this latter concern by comparing the U.S. Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau to the U.K. Behavioural Insights Team, both largely motivated 
by behavioral economics yet very different in practice and outcome.  I conclude 
by explaining the need for behavioral economists to incorporate an accompa-
nying public choice architecture to the improvement of its private choice coun-
terpart. 
II. THE NEED TO NUDGE 
Before delving into the role of public choice architecture in improving 
private choices, it is prudent to examine why private choices need correcting 
in the first place.  Behavioral economists have discovered a wide variety of 
biases that people are prone to display in the laboratory.  The original experi-
ments by Tversky and Kahneman and Kahneman and Tversky found a number 
of behavioral patterns that were difficult to reconcile with neoclassical the-
ory.19  For example, one prominent finding was that losses loomed larger for 
their subjects than corresponding gains, a pattern of behavior that came to be 
known as loss aversion and closely tied to the notion of an endowment effect.20  
Thaler popularized these findings by couching them in consumer theory,21 later 
importing them into mainstream economic conversations through a regular fea-
ture in the Journal of Economics Perspectives.22 
In a replication of the classic Tversky and Kahneman experiments, this 
time with actual monetary payments, Laury and Holt reported that subjects 
were still averse to losses, even when addressed through multiple treatment  
 19. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 4. 
 20. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Ref-
erence-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039, 1045 (1991). 
 21. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980). 
 22. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 20, for a highly influential presentation 
of various behavioral anomalies reported in this series including the endowment effect, 
status quo bias, and loss aversion. 
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effects, such as higher payouts and using other demographics than students as 
their laboratory subjects.23  The authors concurred that these framing effects 
led subjects to make decisions that were inconsistent with those predicted by a 
strict neoclassical framework.  A behavioral framework that incorporated no-
table decision patterns observed in the laboratory would perhaps improve upon 
the traditional use of the neoclassical model in understanding and predicting 
human behavior. 
As Chetty notes, however, “A common criticism of behavioral economics 
is that it does not offer a single unified framework as an alternative to the neo-
classical model.”24  While it is certainly true that this relatively newer disci-
pline has not yet achieved the maturity of the neoclassical approach, several 
have attempted to group its most prominent findings into a more coherent 
framework.  Congdon et al. consolidate these various findings into categorical 
areas where people are most likely to display bias in their decision-making.25  
These categories are imperfect optimization, bounded self-control, and non-
standard preferences.26  For example, returning to the seminal work of Herbert 
Simon, we find in laboratory environments that people are prone to “satisfice,” 
that is to fail to achieve optimal performance in favor of whatever works to 
consistently achieve positive, though suboptimal, levels of success.27  Imper-
fect optimization is at the root of the widely applied “Save More Tomorrow” 
retirement savings plan developed by Thaler and Benartzi to supplement a per-
ceived hyperbolic discounting rate in the allocation of savings over time.28  In 
addition, people have difficulty aligning their short-term preferences with their 
long-term goals.  Indeed, this lack of willpower – or bounded self-control – is 
one of the chief justifications used to empower policymakers to act in the con-
sumer’s interest by, for example, reducing access to certain credit options (e.g., 
payday loans, overdraft protection).  Finally, the well-known behavioral trait 
 
 23. Susan K. Laury & Charles A. Holt, Further Reflections on Prospect Theory 
(Andrew Young Sch. of Policy Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06- 
11, 2005), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2e31/21bb33d6f137d67f8b633a5b2ce295- 
961fe6.pdf. 
 24. Raj Chetty, Behavioral Economics and Public Policy: A Pragmatic Perspec-
tive, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 25 (2015). 
 25. WILLIAM J. CONGDON, JEFFREY R. KLING & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, POLICY 
AND CHOICE: PUBLIC FINANCE THROUGH THE LENS OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 17–39 
(2011). 
 26. Id.  See W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Behavioral Public Choice: The Behav-
ioral Paradox of Government Policy, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 973 (2015), for a 
more detailed analysis of this framework. 
 27. Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 
108 (1955). 
 28. Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: Using Be-
havioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. S164, S166–S170 
(2004). 
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of loss aversion mentioned above shows that we are not always prone to a con-
sistent set of preferences.29  The Allais paradox, which demonstrated a larger 
aversion to perceived losses than a corresponding benefit to expected gains, 
was a pioneering attempt to show that we make inconsistent choices when ex-
posed to different framing contexts.30 
This is a mere glimpse of the many biases subjects display when placed 
in a laboratory environment.  To move from a description of human biases to 
a prescription for how these biases should be addressed in a public forum re-
quired a framework to demonstrate that correcting bias has the potential to im-
prove consumer welfare.  The field of behavioral law and economics seeks to 
do just this and in doing so transforms these normative ideals into actual policy 
outcomes.  An earlier article by Sunstein provided a framework for producing 
policy guided by behavioral insights.31  Jolls et al. expanded on this and intro-
duced the initial concept of “nudge” by way of its earlier, more cumbersome 
label “anti-antipaternalism.”32  The basic principle is the same, which is that 
behavioral insights reveal that people’s decisions can be improved and in a way 
they themselves would value. 
Thaler et al. show how the concept of “nudge” is predicated on the as-
sumption that some will inevitably serve as “choice architects,”33 that is, those 
who structure the choice environment in which people make decisions.  This 
emphasis on “choice architecture” leads to a variety of considerations includ-
ing what incentives are created by the choice environment, how feedback op-
erates, what defaults are in place, and how these choices can be structured in a 
manner that leads to welfare-improving outcomes.  Or in other words, private 
choice architecture can be structured in a manner that is consistent with behav-
ioral insights.  The “nudge” concept has since gone on to capture a wide audi-
ence in the policymaking realm so much so that Kahneman has described the 
insights of Thaler and Sunstein as “the basic manual for applying behavioral 
economics to policy.”34 
Allcott and Sunstein present a consideration that allows policymakers to 
transform these behavioral insights more generally into the realm of rulemak-
ing.35  They employ the concept of “internalities”; these are “costs we impose 
on ourselves by taking actions that are not in our own best interest.”36  Just as 
asymmetric information, externalities, and public goods concerns give way to 
 
 29. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 20. 
 30. M. Allais, L’Extension des Theories de l’Equilibre Economique General et du 
Rendement Social au Cas du Risque [The Extension of the Theories of General Eco-
nomic Balance and Social Performance to Risk], 21 ECONOMETRICA 269 (1953). 
 31. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997). 
 32. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541 (1998). 
 33. Thaler, Sunstein & Balz, supra note 6, at 428. 
 34. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 372 (2011). 
 35. Hunt Allcott & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Internalities, 34 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 698 (2015). 
 36. Id. at 698. 
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charges of so-called “market failure,” failing to exercise self-control or dis-
playing inconsistent preferences allows for the possibility of “behavioral mar-
ket failure.”37  It follows then that policymakers can improve people’s lives in 
ways never attempted previously. 
As Chetty explains, “Expanding the policy set broadens the set of feasible 
allocations that can be achieved, which could ultimately increase welfare.”38  
This pragmatic approach to behavioral economics would lend it the same ac-
cess to policymaking that the older welfare economics program enjoyed.  Bar-
Gill and Sunstein directly placed behavioral economics on the same footing as 
the old welfare approach, arguing, “Standard treatments of ‘market failures’ do 
not devote much discussion to the kinds of ‘behavioral market failures’ that, in 
our view, provide the strongest justification for prominent regulatory re-
gimes.”39  Even the term “behavioral welfare economics” has emerged from 
this discussion, describing a normative approach guided by the work of behav-
ioral economics to expand the set of outcomes that could conceivably improve 
consumer choices.40 
Because of these efforts, behavioral insights are being utilized more to 
address so-called behavioral market failures and are employed in a wide range 
of regulatory policy fields including energy, health, and consumer finance 
among others.  The growing use of this novel framework for thinking about 
how people make decisions would be welcome but for the fact that so little 
effort has been put into examining the bounded rationality of public decision-
makers and accompanying public choice architecture within which these be-
havioral insights will ultimately be utilized. 
III. IN SEARCH OF BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC CHOICE 
Though written over a decade ago, Lambert comments in a most telling 
way on the emergence of these behavioral policies.  In reference to a study 
advocating the utilization of behavioral insights, he states: 
Professor Slovic advocates a governmental fix without first asking 
whether the government is institutionally capable of correcting individ-
uals’ affect-induced tendency to overestimate the risk of terrorism.  This 
is a crucial oversight since the answer to the question is probably no.  
As an initial matter, there is no reason to believe that bureaucrats are 
any less susceptible to cognitive quirks than the citizens they seek to 
protect.  More fundamentally, a democratically accountable agency 
 
 37. See id. 
 38. Chetty, supra note 24, at 5. 
 39. Oren Bar-Gill & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulation as Delegation, 7 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 4 (2015). 
 40. B. Douglas Bernheim, Behavioral Welfare Economics, 7 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 
267 (2009). 
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faces institutional constraints that would render it incapable of correct-
ing affect-induced overestimation of terrorism risks.41 
Unfortunately, little has changed since Lambert’s prescient analysis.  In a 
revealing study of the top ten journals in economics from 2000 to 2009, Berg-
gren analyzes how behavioral economists treat political institutions when of-
fering policy prescriptions.42  He specifically asks whether (a) the authors offer 
explicit policy prescriptions and (b) if they incorporate political institutions 
into their model/experimental design.43  The criteria for this latter element is 
fairly wide, as he only looks to see if they apply their findings to the political 
actor herself, that is, whether the politician is cognitively limited in the same 
manner as everyone else. 
Berggren finds that 20.7% of behavioral economists offer policy prescrip-
tions in the leading journals, with 95.5% of these articles not applying their 
analysis to the politician herself.44  Berggren concludes that while behavioral 
studies are worthwhile in understanding human cognition, they serve as poor 
indicators of actual policy performance with so little attention paid to the po-
litical institution itself.45  These figures are discouraging as without such an 
analysis, any policy prescription is premature – that is not to imply that any 
behavioral intervention will be applied perversely.  In fact, the greater worry is 
that because these authors have not incorporated political institutions into how 
their insights should be applied, they enable a wide range of policy outcomes 
– both positive and negative – with the accompanying volatility in realized 
welfare benefits.46 
While the search for a behavioral public choice remains open, behavioral 
economists have commented (albeit sparingly) on the application of their work 
to political actors.  For example, Sunstein touches upon the problem of public 
officials exercising authority under the same biases as their private counter-
parts.  He states: 
None of these points makes a firm case for legal paternalism, particu-
larly since bureaucrats may be subject to the same cognitive and moti-
 
 41. Thomas A. Lambert, Two Mistakes Behavioralists Make: A Response to Pro-
fessors Feigenson et al. and Professor Slovic, 69 MO. L. REV. 1053, 1059 (2004) (em-
phasis added) (footnotes omitted). See PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000), 
for a complete and authoritative account of overestimation of risks.  
 42. Berggren, supra note 17, at 200. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 215–16. 
 46. It is worth noting that these academics display a certain “policy bias” in that 
they offer policy applications without fully treating the ramifications of such applica-
tion within the analysis itself.  Put another way, it may be that too many policy appli-
cations are offered, given the supporting argumentation, though this is surely a broader 
issue beyond those publishing on the topic of behavioral economics. 
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vational distortions as everyone else.  But they do suggest that objec-
tions to paternalism should be empirical and pragmatic, having to do 
with the possibility of education and likely failures of government re-
sponse, rather than a priori in nature.47 
Sunstein further expands upon and supplements the list by breaking chal-
lenges to behavioral policies down into five broad areas of concern: infor-
mation, competition, heterogeneity, learning, and public choice concerns.48  
This last category in particular acknowledges that public officials are both sub-
ject to influence by special interest groups and susceptible to the same biases 
as the consumers they govern.49 
These are welcome – though limited – additions to the discussion of pub-
lic choice architecture, which represent more than obstacles for successful pol-
icy prescription.50  They are the contextual features in which public decision-
making unfolds.  To take public choice architecture seriously is to incorporate 
this aspect into the policy framework directly.  Otherwise, these policy advo-
cates risk failure in changing private choice architecture in a way that improves 
consumer welfare.  As Alemanno and Spina observe, “It is likely that without 
a rational, fully transparent mechanism to integrate behavioral research into 
policy-making, the wealth of knowledge of this science will continue to have 
only a haphazard, anecdotal and minimal or, as recently illustrated, even coun-
terproductive effect on the activities of public administrations.”51 
The broader consideration of public choice architecture is not often ap-
preciated, even by those directly involved in applying behavioral insights to 
public policy.  Barr et al., for example, propose a framework that would apply 
 
 47.  Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1178 (footnote omitted). 
 48.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternal-
ism, 122 Yale L.J. 1826 (2013).  
 49. See Viscusi & Gayer, supra note 26, at 990–91, and Gary M. Lucas, Jr. & 
Slavisa Tasic, Behavioral Public Choice and the Law, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 199, 213–14 
(2015), for surveys of this new area of “behavioral public choice.”  See Dima Yazji 
Shamoun & Bruce Yandle, Asserting Presidential Preferences in a Regulatory Review 
Bureaucracy, 166 PUB. CHOICE 87 (2016), for a discussion of the public choice archi-
tecture and accompanying incentives generated by special interest groups for presiden-
tial policy.  Sunstein himself led the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(“OIRA”) from 2009 to 2012.  John M. Broder, Powerful Shaper of U.S. Rules Quits, 
with Critics in Wake, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.ny-
times.com/2012/08/04/science/earth/cass-sunstein-to-leave-top-regulatory-post.html. 
 50. Bar-Gill & Sunstein, supra note 39, at 7, exemplify this argument, noting that 
“political economy constraints limit the viability of such opt-out in many cases” in the 
context of optimal regulation of markets.  Their argument is telling in that it positions 
political considerations as a form of transaction cost that prevents optimality, as op-
posed to an underlying institutional concern that would challenge the use of behavioral 
insights more generally.  See id. 
 51. Alberto Alemanno & Alessandro Spina, Nudging Legally: On the Checks and 
Balances of Behavioral Regulation, 12 INT’L J. CON. L. 429, 440 (2014) (footnote omit-
ted). 
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behavioral insights to a wide number of policy environments, noting that their 
framework incorporates both the relationship between the firm and consumer 
along with the firm and regulator.52  This second aspect could conceivably cap-
ture certain public choice architecture in the analysis, but the authors instead 
focus solely on the incentives regulators put into place for regulated firms, as 
opposed to the incentives placed before the regulators themselves.53  Put an-
other way, the relationship is only examined in one direction and so does little 
to add to previous efforts that ignore public choice architecture altogether.  
Nevertheless, they claim that “[b]ehaviorally informed regulation is cognizant 
of the importance of framing and defaults, of the gap between information and 
understanding and between intention and action, and of the role of decisional 
conflict and other psychological factors that affect how people behave.”54  It is 
remarkable that such an impressive list of insights is applied strictly to con-
sumers and firms reacting to government policymaking and not the policymak-
ers themselves.55 
Glaeser provides one notable exception to this trend.  He models choice 
architecture across two corresponding contexts, one public and one private, 
starting from a position of behavioral symmetry across the two contexts and 
then introducing certain institutional parameters to estimate the capacity for 
bias.56  He outlines three cases where the capacity for bias is endogenous to the 
private or public context – that is, generated by unique institutional features – 
and finds in each case that the public context is likely to generate more errors, 
not fewer, than the private context.57  As he maintains, “[T]he flaws in human 
cognition should make us more, not less, wary about trusting government de-
cisionmaking.  The debate over paternalism must weigh private and public er-
rors.”58 
Glaeser’s work is just a start, and as Allcott and Sunstein have noted, 
models with different assumptions than Glaeser’s could potentially show re-
duced error in certain public contexts.59  Nevertheless, the point is not to show 
 
 52. Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally Informed 
Regulation, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 440 (Eldar Shafir, 
ed. 2013). 
 53. See id. at 444–57. 
 54. Id. at 457. 
 55. This is especially pertinent to this discussion of public choice architecture and 
the CFPB, as one of the co-authors (Mullainathan) is currently Assistant Director of 
research at the agency.  See CFPB Organization Chart, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION 
BUREAU, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_org_chart.png (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2017). 
 56. Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 
(2006). 
 57. Id. at 142–49. These results were primarily due to private actors having a 
greater incentive to discover and correct errors than public actors.  Id.  The curious 
reader should refer to Glaeser’s original paper.  Id. at 133–56. 
 58. Id. at 133–34. 
 59. See Allcott & Sunstein, supra note 35, at 698–705. 
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that public actors are always more error-prone; it is that, without incorporating 
political institutions into the actual positive analysis being performed, we are 
limited in our understanding of what policy outcomes will emerge once these 
behavioral insights are utilized.  Despite – or better yet, because of – the great 
potential for improving choices through behavioral intervention, it is essential 
to consider the public choice architecture in which use of the behavioral in-
sights would have to navigate in order to improve consumer welfare. 
To illustrate this point, Viscusi and Gayer look at biases caused by poor 
risk assessment on the part of public actors.  They claim that environmental 
relief fiscal sinkholes like Superfund are more likely due to the greater risk 
aversion of public actors who face little in the way of upside in efficiently reg-
ulating the environment but much downside should a certain environmental 
waste issue become salient to the public.60  This in turn “leads to an overesti-
mation of very small risks and comparative inattention to larger risks.”61 
To be fair, Thaler and Sunstein emphasize the need for empirical verifi-
cation that behavioral interventions are found wanting.62  While acknowledg-
ing the considerable challenges behavioral policies face, they argue that this in 
itself does not overwhelm the potential benefit that comes with improving 
choice architecture for the consumer.63  Nevertheless, the heavy lifting in this 
body of work resides with the analysis of private choice architecture, not the 
accompanying public choice architecture in which all policy recommendations 
must inevitably pass.64 
 
 60. Viscusi & Gayer, supra note 26, at 991–93. 
 61. Id. at 993. 
 62. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 247–48 (2008). 
 63. Id.  
 64. A related example demonstrates the shortcomings of previous behavioral pol-
icy specifically.  Behavioral scientists are particularly keen on the notion of “shrouded 
fees,” which refer to costs that are especially likely to confuse consumers.  See Ryan 
Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1643–44 (2014).  A perennial target of this term is in how banks 
charge their customers for overdrawing an account.  See id. at 1653–58.  In 2010, the 
Federal Reserve – in which the CFPB is housed – required banks to give their customers 
the choice to opt in to overdraft protection.  Id. at 1654–55.  The idea was that consum-
ers are prone to inertia and so may be paying fees that they actually would choose not 
to, if given conscious effort.  See id. at 1655.  To the surprise of many, customers over-
whelmingly rejoined the protection plans.  See id. at 1656.  This caused some behavioral 
economists to argue that stronger restrictions on consumer choice were needed.  See id. 
at 1596–1600; see also Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1186–87, 1211–26 (2013).  Others instead insist that the reaction of 
heavy users of overdraft protection to re-enroll in the service is a rational response to 
the necessity to meet their everyday financial obligations.  See Willis, supra, at 1196.  
The alternative for such customers is not an equity line or other line of credit but instead 
a payday loan or even less reputable source of short-term credit.  Id. at 1176–77.  Ad-
judicating between these two perspectives would surely be easier with a more coherent 
behavioral framework for measuring success. 
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By ignoring public choice architecture, behavioral economists are at a 
minimum risk of seeing their ideas used in ways vastly different than originally 
intended.  Furthermore, the ability to determine improvements in consumer 
welfare is muted by failing to incorporate a crucial component of what ulti-
mately becomes “choice architecture” to the consumer they ostensibly wish to 
assist. 
IV. IMPROVING PUBLIC CHOICES 
This lack of public choice analysis represents more than a pedantic over-
sight.  It is an all too common occurrence as new ideas blind us to the institu-
tional limitations in which we as purposeful human beings actually operate. 
Commenting upon the advancement of science, Hayek similarly claimed that 
a belief, seemingly shared by many scientists, [is] that the range of our 
ignorance is steadily diminishing and that we can therefore aim at more 
comprehensive and deliberate control of all human activities.  It is for 
this reason that those intoxicated by the advance of knowledge so often 
become the enemies of freedom.65 
This is, of course, just the sort of statement that Thaler and Sunstein seek 
to dismiss on empirical grounds.  But Hayek’s claim is a positive one.  The 
assertion is that scientific advances so often lead to premature policy prescrip-
tion, which, given Berggren’s analysis, is a reasonable assessment. 
Behavioral economists are clearly right in that choice does not occur in a 
vacuum.  This insight must be applied, however, consistently across public and 
private spheres.  Using the language introduced earlier, there should be a public 
choice architecture to accompany the private choice architecture we are at-
tempting to improve, at least if these theories are to be applied at the policy 
level.  This not only applies to how we model the decision-maker but also how 
we model the choice architecture in which the decision is made. 
This does not mean that we should assume that the same choice architec-
ture exists across both contexts.  Instead, as Schnellenbach and Schubert state, 
“Explanations of individual behavior in politics should rely on the same moti-
vational assumptions that guide the economic analysis of market behavior.”66  
Put another way, we must examine behavioral “politics without romance.”67 
Integrating public choice architecture into the analysis requires us to think 
of the relevant institutions that will ultimately determine the trajectory of sub-
sequent policy outcomes.  Elinor Ostrom, Nobel Prize Winner and intellectual 
 
 65. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 26 (1960). 
 66. Jan Schnellenbach & Christian Schubert, Behavioral Political Economy: A 
Survey, 40 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 395, 395 (2015). 
 67. James M. Buchanan, Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public 
Choice and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE – II, 11, 11 
(James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984). 
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leader of the Bloomington School, devised an agenda for the study of institu-
tions in practice.68  Her short list of institutions helps identify what elements 
are core aspects of public choice architecture.69  These are: 
(1) Position rules that specify a set of positions and how many participants 
hold each position. 
(2) Boundary rules that specify how participants are chosen to hold these 
positions and how participants leave these positions. 
(3) Scope rules that specify the set of outcomes that may be affected and 
the external inducements and/or costs assigned to each of these outcomes. 
(4) Authority rules that specify the set of actions assigned to a position at 
a particular node. 
(5) Aggregation rules that specify the decision function to be used at a 
particular node to map actions into intermediate or final outcomes. 
(6) Information rules that authorize channels of communication among 
participants in positions and specify the language and form in which commu-
nication will take place. 
(7) Payoff rules that prescribe how benefits and costs are to be distributed 
to participants in positions.70 
While not meant to be exhaustive, this list provides a useful template of 
what is needed to understand how choice operates in public contexts.71 
Translating this framework, known as Institutional Analysis and Devel-
opment (“IAD”), into a useful guide for behavioral policies is no trivial task.  
Nevertheless, it is one of many useful models that behavioral economists would 
be at great advantage to adopt as a means of gauging the effectiveness of their 
policy proposals.  Again, understanding the public choice architecture (or in-
stitutions) by which decisions are rendered is crucial in determining the likeli-
hood that policies will succeed in promoting consumer welfare. 
There are a number of questions these components of public choice ar-
chitecture bring to our attention that can aid in ensuring behavioral policies 
lead to welfare-improving outcomes.  For example, who are the policymakers 
 
 68. Ostrom was herself no stranger to behavioral theories, even remarking in her 
Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association: 
 
We have not yet developed a behavioral theory of collective action based on 
models of the individual consistent with empirical evidence about how individ-
uals make decisions in social-dilemma situations.  A behavioral commitment to 
theory grounded in empirical inquiry is essential if we are to understand such 
basic questions as why face-to-face communication so consistently enhances 
cooperation in social dilemmas or how structural variables facilitate or impede 
effective collective action. 
 
Elinor Ostrom, Presidential Address, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice 
Theory of Collective Action, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (1998). 
 69. Elinor Ostrom, An Agenda for the Study of Institutions, 48 PUB. CHOICE 3, 3–
5 (1986). 
 70. Id. at 17. 
 71. Id. at 16. 
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responsible for implementing the behavioral intervention?  What is the scope 
of their (e.g., underlying agency) authority?  What are the institutional incen-
tives facing these policymakers?  How do policymakers accumulate infor-
mation used to formulate these policies?  And from what sources?  Is there any 
measurement by which we can estimate the effectiveness of the behavioral in-
tervention?  Does the choice environment encourage compliance with the pro-
posals made by behavioral economists?  Or are policymakers encouraged to 
break from these policy origin points? 
To illustrate this approach in practice, consider the argument for the ne-
cessity of a default position.72  Behavioral economists are right, of course, that 
in many cases a default must be chosen.  Coase famously made this point73 in 
reference to the establishment of property rights when transaction costs pro-
hibit private adjudication.  In cases like this, the choice of default is crucial, 
and perhaps enhanced if informed by insights from behavioral economics.  It 
should equally be informed, though, by the insights of public choice.  What 
does it matter if the proper behavioral considerations are considered at the 
formative level if the actual administrator simply chooses to ignore them, or 
worse, uses them to pursue an undesirable end? 
Take the popular behavioral example of a school administrator consider-
ing where to place healthy food in a school cafeteria described at the beginning 
of Nudge.74  In this particular case, the scope of authority is largely defined 
upfront.75  The administrator has to choose something, as the food will not just 
sort itself.  In addition, the administrator has a preference for kids to eat healthy 
food instead of junk food and so could place healthier choices in the front of 
the cafeteria line.  This would make kids more likely to choose them, thereby 
providing a better outcome through behavioral correction, albeit of the softer 
variety.76 
Harford offers a challenge to even this simple choice environment.  While 
noting that “most of the best examples Thaler and Sunstein suggest are inno-
vations in the private or voluntary sectors,” he exposes the different outcomes 
that emerge when behavioral interventions are imposed publicly rather than 
privately.77  When we take into account how the transformation of outcomes 
takes place in practice, policies aimed at correcting individual choices often 
 
 72. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1171–90 (2003). 
 73. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 74. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 62, at 1. 
 75. But see Robert Sugden, Why Incoherent Preferences Do Not Justify Paternal-
ism, 19 CONST. POL. ECON. 226, 238 (2008), for an Austrian challenge as to the entre-
preneurial feasibility of even this simple choice environment. 
 76. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 72, at 1164–66. 
 77. TIM HARTFORD, ADAPT: WHY SUCCESS ALWAYS STARTS WITH FAILURE 193 
(2011). 
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involve hardline coercion by way of regulation on firms.78  For example, in 
reference to the cafeteria example, he ponders what would really happen if a 
law required restaurants to display healthier food choices more prominently.79  
Perhaps this would elicit greater advertisement of healthy choices, or perhaps 
it would motivate restaurants to abandon healthier choices altogether to avoid 
the cumbersome legislation in its entirety.80  Just as “protecting” endangered 
species often leads to the unwanted consequence of “shooting, shoveling, and 
shutting up,” “protecting” healthy choices could serve to further marginalize 
their already tenuous existence.81 
Another troubling aspect of the cafeteria example is that it simplifies the 
information retrieval process to a degree far more trivial than what policymak-
ers would find confronting consumers in actual nested choice contexts.  As 
Schnellenbach states, “If information on individual preferences and beliefs 
cannot be centralized by a government planner, then neither soft nor hard pa-
ternalist policies can reliably move the economy closer to its utility possibility 
frontier, but they always redistribute welfare between heterogeneous individu-
als.”82  To reiterate the author’s point, even soft paternalism in the form of a 
nudge can only be demonstrated to be utility maximizing if it is known ex ante 
how consumers will react to a given policy.  The reason for this is that nudges, 
like their harder paternalistic counterparts, redress biased behavior by making 
it more expensive, if not in terms of pecuniary cost then in some other form 
that would diminish its utility (e.g., requiring additional steps to opt out of a 
certain service that policymakers feel is beneficial).  This is only utility max-
imizing if we know that consumers are indeed worse off as a result of their 
biased choices, a possible though strong assumption to make.83 
In short, these institutional considerations can help inform us as to the 
veracity of behavioral policy in action to which we now turn. 
V. EXAMINING THE PUBLIC CHOICE ARCHITECTURE OF BEHAVIORAL 
POLICIES 
To better appreciate the role of public choice architecture, let us compare 
two government agencies motivated by behavioral economics.  This provides 
us with the means to address Thaler and Sunstein’s challenge to provide em-
pirical verification by demonstrating the added value of incorporating public  
 78. Mullane & Sheffrin, supra note 15, at 2; see Adam C. Smith & Todd Zywicki, 
Behavior, Paternalism, and Policy: Evaluating Consumer Financial Protection, 9 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 201, 242–44 (2015). 
 79. HARTFORD, supra note 77, at 193. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Jan Schnellenbach, Nudges and Norms: On the Political Economy of Soft Pa-
ternalism, 28 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 266, 269 (2012). 
 83. As Chetty explains in the choice context of retirement savings, “[R]esponses 
that appear to be consistent with optimization in the aggregate may mask significant 
deviations from optimization at the individual level.”  Chetty, supra note 24, at 8. 
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choice architecture.  Or as Hyman and Kovacic explain, “Simply stated, what 
an agency is assigned to do and where it is located matters.”84 
As it so happens, our two examples have emerged from like-minded pol-
icymakers on separate sides of the Atlantic.  In the United States, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau applies behavioral economics to regulating the fi-
nancial industry.  In the United Kingdom, previously located within the gov-
ernment itself, the Behavioural Insights Team or so-called “Nudge Unit” is 
tasked with improving a variety of government services. 
Note that this discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of 
the activities of the two agencies.  It is instead intended to showcase how public 
choice architecture can transform similar policy ideas into very different policy 
outcomes.  Therefore, I do not attempt to provide an exhaustive analysis of the 
effectiveness of their respective policies.  The curious reader should consult 
the articles cited to judge the efficacy of these policies in practice.  Instead, I 
wish to illuminate the impact of public choice architecture on the application 
of policies generated by behavioral ideas.  As I will show, generating policy 
proposals with no mention of the underlying public choice architecture leads 
to undesirable variability in the actual policy outcome in a way that obscures 
the ultimate effects on consumer welfare. 
A. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) emerged as one of 
the key reforms in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), itself a response to the global financial crisis of 
2008 to 2010.  The CFPB’s chief architect was Harvard Law Professor Eliza-
beth Warren, now Senator of Massachusetts.  Warren forcefully argued the 
need to protect consumers from the perceived harm rendered by their creditors, 
a harm of which consumers are not typically aware.85  In a highly influential 
follow-up article, Bar-Gill and Warren demonstrated various shortcomings in 
consumer rationality with respect to credit transactions including framing ef-
fects, the influence of inertia, and optimism bias.86  They ended their analysis 
with a call for a new agency that would assist consumers in making more ra-
tional decisions.87  They further argued that an agency with the proper motiva-
tion and authority needed to be created, as existing agencies lacked one or both 
of these two features.88 
 
 84. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: Gov-
ernmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446, 1451 
(2014). 
 85. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY (2007), http://democra-
cyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/. 
 86. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
1 (2008). 
 87. Id. at 98–100. 
 88. Id. 
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Thus, the CFPB was born.89  Its self-stated mission is as follows: “The 
CFPB is a 21st century agency that helps consumer finance markets work by 
making rules more effective, by consistently and fairly enforcing those rules, 
and by empowering consumers to take more control over their economic 
lives.”90  Currently led by the former state attorney general of Ohio, Richard 
Cordray, the agency is guided by a team of behavioral economists, including 
Richard Thaler.91  This group represents more than a backroom set of advisers.  
As Pridgen explains, the creation of this agency represents a “shift from the 
use of pure disclosures as consumer protection under the rational choice theory 
of economics, to a system of regulation-based on the more realistic view of 
consumer decision-making as revealed by behavioral economics.”92  Accord-
ingly, a secure advisory role has been laid for behavioral insights.  Indeed, 
Wright maintains that this paradigm shift in the regulation of consumer finance 
has fully superseded the older welfare-based framework in guiding policy.93 
Bar-Gill and Sunstein go so far as to claim that the CFPB is “structured . 
. . in a way that aligns its interests with those of individual consumers.”94  This 
is a rather strong claim given that the agency is constituted in a peculiar way 
of particular relevance for this paper.  As I will explain below, greater insularity 
discourages the kinds of experimentation and collaboration with the relevant 
parties necessary to make best use of behavioral insights.  Because of the ar-
guments put forth by Bar-Gill and Warren, along with the stringent efforts of 
Warren herself when she was Assistant to the President,95 the agency was set 
up to be extraordinarily insulated from legislative interference, a fact that has 
 
 89. See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 84, at 1485–88, for a more extensive dis-
cussion of its inception. 
 90. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 
STRATEGIC PLAN: FY 2013 – FY 2017 at 5 (2013), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.con-
sumerfinance.gov/f/strategic-plan.pdf. 
 91. CFPB Announces Consumer Advisory Board Members, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-announces-consumer-advisory-
board-members/.  In addition, Hyman and Kovacic point out that, “The CFPB hired a 
prominent behavioral economist [Sendhil Mullainathan] as its first Assistant Director 
of Research,” noting that “[m]any behavioral economists believe insights from research 
in consumer psychology justify expansive regulatory intervention into financial ser-
vices markets.”  Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 84, at 1492; see also Glaeser, supra 
note 56, at 133–56. 
 92. Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger 
Agency and Stronger Laws, 13 WYO. L. REV. 405, 405 (2013). 
 93. See Wright, supra note 11, at 2252. 
 94. Bar-Gill & Sunstein, supra note 39, at 21. 
 95. Press Release, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PRESS SEC’Y, President Obama 
Names Elizabeth Warren Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the Sec’y of 
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caused some to question the constitutionality of the agency.96  While it is 
housed within the Federal Reserve, its budget cannot be changed by the Fed.  
Furthermore, its Director is given a five-year appointment and cannot be re-
moved once appointed except for “cause.”  Indeed, on October 11, 2016, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down this last feature, citing that it gave 
the Director more power than any officeholder besides the President of the 
United States.97  The court has since vacated this ruling after agreeing to hear 
an appeal en banc and is currently deliberating whether to send the appeal to 
the Supreme Court.98 
Finally, the CFPB is not accountable to Congress in terms of appropria-
tions or oversight, an especially strong constraint given that other similar agen-
cies that regulate consumer products, such as the Federal Trade Commission, 
are subject to review by bipartisan commissions.99  While the Financial Stabil-
ity Oversight Council – housed within the Treasury Department – was set up 
as a veto authority should the CFPB’s rulings threaten overarching financial 
stability,100 this group has yet to consider a motion or otherwise credibly con-
strain CFPB activity. 
According to the CFPB’s strategic plan, this peculiar form101 of public 
choice architecture was necessary to push back against corporate interests and 
consistent with other financial regulatory bodies like the Federal Reserve, 
claiming: 
The Congress, in implementing the Dodd-Frank Act, followed a 
long-established precedent in providing the CFPB with funding outside 
of the congressional appropriations process to ensure full independence 
as the Bureau supervises and regulates providers of consumer financial 
products and services and protects consumers.  Congress has consist-
ently provided for independent funding for bank supervisors to allow 
for long-term planning and the execution of complex initiatives and to 
 
 96. Susan E. Dudley, Is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Unconstitu-
tional?, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susandud-
ley/2016/04/15/is-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-unconstitu-
tional/#3555262764e7. 
 97. See Brent Kendall & Yuka Hayashi, Appeals Court Deals Setback to Con-
sumer-Watchdog Agency, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 11, 2016, 7:51 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-appeals-court-finds-structure-of-cfpb-unconsti-
tutional-1476197389; PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2016), reh’g en banc granted, order vacated (Feb. 16, 2017). 
 98. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 1. 
 99. Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Men-
ace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 857–59 (2013). 
 100. See id. at 874. 
 101. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 90, at 9–13; see generally Richard 
E. Wagner, The Peculiar Business of Politics, 36 CATO J. 335 (2016) (describing states 
as networks of peculiar enterprises that are obligated to raise sufficient revenue to return 
profits to investors).  
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ensure that banks are examined regularly and thoroughly for compli-
ance with the law.102 
Nevertheless, Hyman and Kovacic summarize this agency’s institutional struc-
ture by claiming that, “the combination of protections afforded by Dodd-Frank 
makes the CFPB unique.  The bundle of autonomy mechanisms, along with the 
independent-agency-within-an-independent-agency structure, gives the CFPB 
unmatched insulation from the accountability devices that apply to all other 
federal regulators.”103  This was certainly the opinion of the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals, which labeled them a “gross departure” from the traditional agency 
model.104  Furthermore, its institutional structure is likely to encourage stand-
ard bureaucratic pitfalls, as “[t]hese risks are particularly pronounced for the 
CFPB, given the breadth of its substantive mandate, its powerful implementa-
tion tools, and the absence or relaxation of institutional controls that constrain 
other regulatory bodies.”105  Even if these pitfalls were somehow avoided, the 
agency has an enormous mandate to devise and enforce the duties imposed by 
the Dodd-Frank Act.106 
Zywicki shows how the CFPB’s relatively loose constitutional structure 
would likely elicit just this kind of bureaucratic overreach, noting with respect 
to these tendencies that “[s]everal are particularly relevant in understanding the 
flaws in the CFPB’s institutional design: a tunnel vision selection bias and 
commitment to regulatory mission, systematic risk-averse bias in agency deci-
sionmaking, a tendency toward agency overreach and expansionism, and a 
heightened risk of regulatory capture by industry participants.”107  As 
Zywicki’s analysis demonstrates, institutions map into predictable outcomes, 
even when these outcomes depart from the underlying set of motivating ideas. 
While still early in its development as a Washington bureau, the CFPB 
has displayed a muscular effort in a number of areas, most notably with credit 
card fees, mortgage loans, auto lending, student loans, and general consumer 
banking practices.  In each case, the CFPB has exercised formidable powers in 
regulating consumer markets.  For example, in the case of consumer banking 
practices, the CFPB has been attentive to the kinds of fees banks charge their 
customers.  These fees often offset, however, the costs of maintaining accounts 
with low-income customers.  The pressure on banks to reduce or eliminate 
these fees has resulted in a reduction of free checking accounts by half since 
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.108  
 102. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 90, at 36–37. 
 103. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 84, at 1488. 
 104. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 
reh’g en banc granted, order vacated (Feb. 16, 2017). 
 105. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 84, at 1492. 
 106. See id. at 1475. 
 107. Zywicki, supra note 99, at 875–76. 
 108. TODD ZYWICKI, THE DODD-FRANK ACT FIVE YEARS LATER: ARE WE MORE 
STABLE? 3 (2015), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-ba00-
wstate-tzywicki-20150709.pdf.  
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One of the initial efforts by the new agency was to define so-called “qual-
ified mortgages” based upon the customers’ ability to pay.  In other words, 
mortgages offered to consumers with a proven FICO score are labeled “quali-
fied.”  Though the measure was meant to increase customers’ awareness of 
their ability to pay, the added consequence of the policy is to discourage loans 
to low-income households.  Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen stated, “Banks, 
at this point, are reluctant to lend to borrowers with lower FICO [credit] scores.  
They mention in meetings with us consistently their concerns about putback 
risk, and I think they are – it is difficult for any homeowner who doesn’t have 
pristine credit these days to get a mortgage.”109 
Another policy area the CFPB has made efforts to address is auto lending.  
The agency has accused auto lenders of prejudice in how they determine lend-
ing rates.  According to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, lenders cannot dis-
criminate in offering borrowing terms on the basis of race, color, religion, na-
tional origin, sex, marital status, or age.110  The overtones of racism in lending 
practices are a leading argument on behalf of the CFPB, with Director Cordray 
exclaiming, “Consumers should not have to pay more for a car loan simply 
based on their race.”111  The solution for such discriminatory practices, Cordray 
claims, is to offer a uniform markup rate across consumers.112 
As a consequence, the CFPB expanded the scope of its mandate to not 
only include large lending institutions, but also non-bank lending organizations 
located in the automotive industry.  This constitutes a significant and somewhat 
surprising shift in responsibilities, as the Dodd-Frank Act, which established 
the CFPB, specifically barred the agency from going after motor vehicle deal-
ers.113  Regardless, the CFPB has moved forward claiming that these firms cre-
ate a market that is being under-represented and misinformed.  The basis for 
its intervention is whether the auto dealers are breaking existing law.  Since the 
agency is not technically creating new rules (at least for now), this ostensibly 
keeps them in the confines of the mandate provided by the Dodd-Frank Act.114 
The major complaint again is that terms and conditions are not well-spec-
ified, leading under-informed consumers into financial obligations they cannot 
afford.115  The automotive industry does provide a significant number of in-
 
 109. TRANSCRIPT OF CHAIR YELLEN’S PRESS CONFERENCE (2014), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20140618.pdf.  
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2012). 
 111. Nadia Taha, Consumer Agency Warns Lenders on Bias in Auto Loans, N.Y. 
TIMES: BUCKS: MAKING THE MOST OF YOUR MONEY (Mar. 21, 2013, 2:49 PM), 
https://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/consumer-agency-warns-lenders-on-
bias-in-auto-loans/?ref=autoloans&_r=0. 
 112. Id.  
 113. See Pridgen, supra note 92, at 413. 
 114. Robin Sidel & Alan Zibel, Regulators Scrutinize Auto Lenders Over Add-Ons, 
WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2013, 7:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424127887324582004578459170902840306. 
 115. Id. 
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house loans, usually geared towards those with lower credit and/or fewer out-
side lending options.  These loans tend to have a longer term period and can 
have increasing rates, should the consumer get behind on payments, as these 
loans are structured to assist high-risk debtors. 
As a result of this pressure to charge flat rates across different consumers, 
several companies, such as Honda Motors’ financing arm, have raised their 
wholesale rate while reducing the amount of loan markup discretion of their 
dealers, with the total cost of the loan increasing in many cases.116  The long-
term result will more than likely be a massive downturn in auto lending, par-
ticularly for low-income households.  This prompted a number of minority-
sponsored interests to challenge the CFPB’s assessment.  Damon Lester, pres-
ident of the National Association of Minority Automobile Dealers, stated, “The 
CFPB is refusing to share how they came to the conclusion that dealerships 
have unintentionally discriminated or why.”117  He also commented on the im-
pact these interventions have on the underlying market, claiming, “The CFPB 
is fundamentally changing the multibillion-dollar automobile marketplace and 
yet the bureau is not clear on how their actions will impact auto lending, con-
sumers or the economy.”118  In addition, a letter to the CFPB included signa-
tures from Democratic Representatives Joyce Beatty of Ohio, William Lacy 
Clay of Missouri, Gregory Meeks of New York, and David Scott of Georgia, 
all members of the black caucus.119 
Student loans are a third policy area of interest for the CFPB.  Here, the 
CFPB has primarily targeted the private sector, which only encompasses 
around fifteen percent of the overall market.  The reason for this focus is that 
the Department of Education regulates the public provision of student loans.  
That said, the CFPB has been particularly aggressive in its suggestion that this 
legal boundary may be crossed at some point in the not-too-distant future.  In 
a March 2013 rule proposal, the agency sought to oversee nonbank student 
lending institutions, especially those with more than a million accounts.  This 
would include the government’s largest student loan vendor, Sallie Mae, which 
is currently overseen by the Department of Education.  It also involved itself 
in the investigation of private, for-profit schools at the behest of the Obama 
administration.120 
 
 116. AnnaMaria Andriotis & Gautham Nagesh, Crackdown on Racial Bias Could 
Boost Drivers’ Costs for Auto Loans, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2015, 8:08 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/crackdown-on-racial-bias-could-boost-drivers-costs-for-
auto-loans-1441038864. 
 117. House Democrats Seek Details on Consumer Bureau Auto Loan Rules, 
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (May 30, 2013, 8:54 AM), http://www.autonews.com/arti-
cle/20130530/OEM11/130539998/house-democrats-seek-details-on-consumer-
bureau-auto-loan-rules. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Opinion, Obama’s For-profit Execution: How to Kill a Company Without 
Proving a Single Allegation, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29, 2016, 7:05 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/obamas-for-profit-execution-1472511905. 
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The agency’s primary goal has been to reduce the amount of student loan 
debt, a goal not necessarily consistent with behavioral foundations.121  That is 
to say, there would need to be behavioral evidence for students taking on debt 
in a manner not consistent with rational choice.  Rather than confront this evi-
dentiary burden, the agency has instead called for loan companies to consider 
certain debt consolidation schemes not currently offered in the marketplace.122  
What is telling about these efforts is how the CFPB specifies the ideal outcome 
without detailing the market process by which companies should achieve it. 
B. The Nudge Unit 
The Behavioural Insights Team, or “Nudge Unit,” was founded in 2010 
at the behest of Prime Minister David Cameron’s coalition government.123  It 
was originally situated within the U.K. government’s Cabinet Office but is now 
a mutual venture between the U.K. government and private interests, which I 
will address further below.  Led by psychologist David Halpern, the team was 
originally designed to help create efficiencies within the U.K. government but 
has since broadened its goals to impact a number of areas, not all confined to 
the United Kingdom.  The agency now describes itself as follows: “The Be-
havioural Insights Team (BIT) is a social purpose company.  We are jointly 
owned by the UK Government; Nesta (the innovation charity); and our em-
ployees.”124 
The Nudge Unit operates in a different manner than the CFPB.  It has a 
flatter hierarchy with a far smaller staff.  It also is largely able to manage its 
own agenda and so avoids much of the bureaucratic pitfalls that most agencies 
face, such as the short-run bias noted by Sobel and Leeson.125  The group has 
also had little turnover, a markedly different result than the CFPB, which has 
contributed to more consistency and solidarity in pushing forward the group’s 
agenda.126 
 
 121. See Andrew Soergel, CFPB Takes Aim at Student Loan Forgiveness, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 22, 2017, 12:35 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/arti-
cles/2017-06-22/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-takes-aim-at-student-loan-for-
giveness. 
 122. See AnnaMaria Andriotis, Wells Fargo Investigated by CFPB over Student 
Loan Servicing, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2015, 3:46 PM), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/cfpb-investigating-wells-fargo-on-student-loan-servicing-1444333614. 
 123. See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 64, at 1596. 
 124. Who We Are, BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TEAM, http://www.behaviour-
alinsights.co.uk/about-us/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2017).  It is worth noting that Nudge 
co-author Richard Thaler is a formal advisor of this group as well.  See Peter John, 
Policy Entrepreneurship in UK Central Government: The Behavioural Insights Team 
and the Use of Randomized Controlled Trials, 29 PUB. POL’Y. & ADMIN. 257, 259 
(2014). 
 125. Russell S. Sobel & Peter T. Leeson, Government’s Response to Hurricane 
Katrina: A Public Choice Analysis, 127 PUB. CHOICE 55, 68–69 (2006). 
 126. John, supra note 124, at 262–63. 
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Like the CFPB, the Nudge Unit is a relatively new organization and so 
has not generated many observations to study.  Nevertheless, there are several 
policy areas in which the team has had a noticeable impact, first and foremost, 
in the area of tax collections.  Hallsworth et al. describe a series of experiments 
in which tax delinquency notices were accompanied by different messages.127  
Some of these messages appealed to social norms (e.g., “Nine out of ten people 
in the U.K. pay their tax on time.  You are currently in the very small minority 
of people who have not paid us yet.”), while others invoked the government 
services that taxes provide.128  In each case, tax compliance went up with the 
most effective messages increasing tax collection by five percent.129 
Because of this success, the Nudge Unit ran a second series of experi-
ments that attempted to ascertain just what motivated the highest levels of tax 
compliance.  Specifically, the experiment compared the effects of descriptive 
(i.e., what others do) and injunctive (i.e., what others think should be done) 
norms.130  Results indicated that a simple description of the norms of tax com-
pliance were most effective in increasing payments.131  As they point out, tar-
geting tax delinquency with different messages is virtually cost-free to the gov-
ernment and, as a result, has been widely adopted by various government bu-
reaus in the United Kingdom.132 
Haynes et al. present a closely related set of experiments that are targeted 
at those owing court fines.133  The experimental team sent different text mes-
sages indicating either the person’s name, the amount owed, or a combination 
of the two.134  They found these text messages to be an effective way of reach-
ing an otherwise reticent target population.  Simply sending a text message 
with the person’s name nearly tripled the amount of fines collected compared 
to when no text was sent.135 
The Nudge Unit has found success in a number of other areas with similar 
experimental approaches including pension plan sign-ups, university applica-
tions, charitable giving, electoral registration, and organ donations.136  In each 
 
 127. Michael Hallsworth et al., The Behavioralist as Tax Collector: Using Natural 
Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance, 148 J. PUB. ECON. 14, 16–17 (2017). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 18–19. 
 130. Id. at 15. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Laura C. Haynes et al., Collection of Delinquent Fines: An Adaptive Random-
ized Trial to Assess the Effectiveness of Alternative Text Messages, 32 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 718, 720–21 (2013). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 728. 
 136. For a more detailed description of these experiments see BEHAVIOURAL 
INSIGHTS TEAM, EAST: FOUR SIMPLE WAYS TO APPLY BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS (2014), 
http://38r8om2xjhhl25mw24492dir.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/up-
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case, the Nudge Unit conducts experiments to test the most effective method 
of achieving the outcome intended by the team.  They also point out where 
nudges fail and certain pitfalls to avoid when applying behavioral insights.  
Above all, the team emphasizes that context matters, so each environment will 
need certain adaptations or nudges to be successful. 
Due to its success, the Nudge Unit has since spun off the U.K. Cabinet 
and is now a mutual joint venture between the cabinet, Nesta (the United King-
dom’s innovation foundation), and the BIT staff.137  This has enabled the team 
to work with other vendors besides the U.K. government and broadened the 
potential areas where the nudges it designs can be used.  It also enables the 
team to profit from its activities.138 
VI. INSTITUTIONS MATTER 
While the two agencies, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and 
Behavioural Insights Team, both apply behavioral insights and even share the 
guidance of one of the Nudge co-authors, Richard Thaler, the strategies em-
ployed and consequent outcomes of their policies could not be more different.  
While the Nudge Unit utilizes experimental design and adaptive learning, the 
CFPB is more heavy-handed and subject to tunnel-vision in its use of policy 
tools. 
As noted above, to apply the IAD framework in its entirety to the two 
organizations would take us beyond the scope of this paper.  I will confine my 
analysis to a circumscribed list of considerations that will capture many of the 
questions asked above without belaboring the thesis of this paper that public 
choice architecture matters with respect to policy outcomes. 
The respective political mandates for the CFPB and BIT obviously differ.  
While the BIT must elicit cooperation from various departments within the 
U.K. government – along with the private companies it now works with – in 
order to pursue its behavioral agenda, the CFPB is more or less responsible for 
its own domain of consumer activity, a domain that it has strived to expand. 
Limiting the scope of authority increases focus and concomitantly re-
duces the variability of policy.  By setting the CFPB up to operate aggressively 
and independently of other government organizations, the result has been a de-
viation from the agency’s original goals into areas of consumer choice and pol-
icy interventions that exceed the guidelines set out by behavioral economics.  
As Hyman and Kovacic explain, “[A]n agency with a sweeping, adaptable 
mandate has incentives to extend the boundaries of its authority, in order to  
loads/2015/07/BIT-Publication-EAST_FA_WEB.pdf.  See also a list of the BIT’s pub-
lications at Academic Publications, BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TEAM, http://www.behav-
iouralinsights.co.uk/academic-publications/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2017). 
 137. John, supra note 124, at 261. 
 138. Patrick Wintour, Government’s Behaviour Insight Team to Become a Mutual 
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show it is fulfilling the goals Congress set for it.  Open-ended assertions of 
authority invite carelessness in implementation.”139  This led to the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision described above, where the CFPB was found 
enforcing a certain administrative provision erroneously.140 
Kuran and Sunstein argue that agencies should have certain institutional 
checks such as mandatory cost-benefit analysis, peer review by other agencies, 
and/or congressional oversight in order to avoid overly aggressive intervention 
into consumer practices.141  This makes sense as public acrimony is hardly a 
reliable gauge by which policy should be adjudicated, as Thaler and Sunstein 
propose.142  After all, consumers who are believed to be incapable of making 
their own choices are surely incapable of evaluating the actions of regulators.  
Because the CFPB faces so little in the way of institutional constraints, it has 
become prone to much of the excesses feared by Kuran and Sunstein.  
The BIT, on the other hand, is considered a successful endeavor by a wide 
swath of interested parties despite (or perhaps because of) the fact it has “very 
little money and no power to do its job.”143  In having so little authority ex ante, 
the group must ensure that the relevant parties truly benefit from the proposed 
policies, in contrast to the more aggressive practices of the CFPB.  By showing 
how these policies work through experimental practice, the agency is better 
able to convince others of the efficacy of its practices. 
The underlying lesson here is that overwhelming government authority 
and improving social welfare are hardly mutually enforcing.  Public organiza-
tions that are forced to be cooperative by way of their institutional constraints 
(e.g., having a budget set by congressional oversight) are more likely to deliver 
policies consistent with a broader set of interests than organizations with no 
 
 139. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 84, at 1502 (footnote omitted).  The Wall Street 
Journal’s Peter Wallison describes the agency as follows: 
 
  The consumer bureau, on the other hand, roams the financial landscape en-
forcing 18 statutes and bringing actions that can cost hundreds of millions of 
dollars.  It writes rules governing a wide swath of American business, has the 
power to define what is “unfair” or “abusive” in financial services, investigates 
companies and imposes penalties. 
 
Peter Wallison, Consumer Financial Protection Racket, WALL ST. J. (April 24, 2016, 
4:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/consumer-financial-protection-racket-
1461530729.  Playful language aside, the comment is telling in how it describes the 
broad authoritative responsibilities of the CFPB, which include investigation, enforce-
ment, and adjudication of an incredible range of market interactions, all with little over-
sight by outside authority. 
 140. See Kendall & Hayashi, supra note 97; PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, order vacated (Feb. 16, 
2017). 
 141. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 751–54 (1999). 
 142. See id. at 736–45. 
 143. John, supra note 124, at 258. 
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such incentives.  Substituting “[o]pen-ended assertions of authority” for insti-
tutional constraints instead invites conflict both with other government organ-
izations and the underlying market.144 
As an example of this latter effect, consider the costs of complying with 
this new set of regulations.  Compliance complaints are more than simple bick-
ering by affected firms; their impact can create a substantial reorientation of 
the underlying market.145  For example, a study by the Mercatus Center found: 
71 percent of small banks stated that the CFPB has affected their busi-
ness activities.  Sixty-four percent of small banks reported that they 
were making changes to their mortgage offerings because of Dodd-
Frank and 15 percent said that they had either exited or were consider-
ing exiting residential mortgage markets entirely.  Nearly 60 percent of 
small banks reported that the CFPB or the qualified mortgage rule had 
a “significant negative impact” on their mortgage operations.  Nearly 
60 percent said that the CFPB has had a significant negative effect on 
bank earnings and more than 60 percent said that changes in mortgage 
regulations had had a significant negative effect on bank earnings.146 
These compliance costs associated with policymaking are particularly onerous 
to small banks as they reduce the competitive pressure these firms can put on 
larger banks.147  The CFPB has also been noted as failing to properly notify 
firms of the results of its examination process along with generating confusion 
with respect to the terms of ending its investigation.148  An additional criticism 
is that the CFPB publishes enormous policy documents, a far cry from the sim-
plicity emphasized in Nudge.149 
The criticism perhaps most pertinent to the validity of welfare-improving 
outcomes of the CFPB involves cutting off credit: that is, when policy rules 
eliminate certain aspects of the marketplace altogether, despite the market al-
ternatives that will inevitably arise as a result.  The issue here is not about 
 
 144. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 84, at 1503; see Eric Boehm, Nevertheless It 
Persists: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fights Trump, Congress, and 
Federal Courts in Effort to Remain Unaccountable to Anyone, REASON.COM (Jun. 2, 
2017, 9:15 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2017/06/02/nevertheless-it-persists-the-con-
sumer-fi.  
 145. See Peter T. Calcagno & Russell S. Sobel, Regulatory Costs on Entrepreneur-
ship and Establishment Employment Size, 42 SMALL BUS. ECON. 541 (2014).  
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 147. Bill Poovey, Banks Look for Regulatory Relief on Nov. 8, GSA BUS. REP. (Aug. 
25, 2016), http://gsabusiness.com/news/banking-finance/70341/. 
 148. BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: 
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whether a policy is successful or not but the deeper reality that markets will 
create new, less desirable platforms for trading (e.g., black markets) in re-
sponse to market bans.  It also captures what Congdon describes when he main-
tains that “[t]oo narrow a focus might result in policy recommendations that 
are locally effective but globally counterproductive.”150  By eliminating a per-
ceived localized behavioral market failure, the agency risks disrupting the un-
derlying market in a manner that reduces consumer welfare. 
The BIT, on the other hand, transforms ideas into policy through experi-
mental design.  As Smith outlines, experiments provide a space in which to test 
existing theories, establish empirical regularities to create new theories, evalu-
ate policy proposals, and prototype novel institutional designs.151  The BIT ap-
proaches policy solutions through a series of experiments generated to test ap-
propriate means of eliciting desired outcomes.  Once success is found, the 
agency then builds upon these findings to identify why the strategy is success-
ful.  It then provides recommendations on how to implement it. 
Again, it is most likely due to the lack of authority and financial support 
that forces the agency to make policy agreeable to a large group of interested 
parties.  John notes, “The team operates collaboratively which largely reflects 
its small size and the need for willing partners to carry out its interventions.”152  
Policies that benefit all (or at least most) of the parties involved are crucial in 
justifying interventions based upon behavioral insights.  As Lunn notes, “BE 
[Behavioral Economics] has had its most concrete effects on policy where find-
ings point to policies that are in the interests of all parties affected by the deci-
sion being influenced.”153 
The BIT retrieves information mostly through its experimental testing.  It 
describes its information retrieval tactics as follows: “We are also highly em-
pirical; we test and trial these ideas before they are scaled up.  This enables us 
to understand what works and (importantly) what does not work.”154  This last 
aspect refers to its use of randomized control trials as a means of not only col-
lecting, but also refining the data it analyzes. 
The CFPB, by comparison, employs a wide number of information-gath-
ering tactics.155  According to its strategic plan, “The CFPB is a data-driven 
agency.  We take in data, manage it, store it, share it appropriately, and protect 
it from unauthorized access.  Our aim is to use data purposefully, to analyze 
and distill data to enable informed decision-making in all internal and external 
 
 150. William J. Congdon, Psychology and Economic Policy¸ in THE BEHAVIORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 465, 469 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013). 
 151. Vernon L. Smith, Economics in the Laboratory, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 113, 113–
16 (1994). 
 152. John, supra note 124, at 260. 
 153. Peter D. Lunn, Behavioural Economics and Policymaking: Learning from the 
Early Adopters, 43 ECON. & SOC. REV. 423, 433 (2012). 
 154. Who We Are, supra note 124. 
 155. For research and partial data collected by the CFPB, see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2017).  
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/12
2017] UTILIZING BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS (WITHOUT ROMANCE) 765 
functions.”156  The agency collects information through several avenues, most 
importantly through its own requests to firms.  These requests have been called 
excessively burdensome and often outside the scope of the agency’s jurisdic-
tion.157  Furthermore, often the purpose of the information request is not dis-
closed to the targeted firm, leaving in question the ultimate outcome of the 
agency’s investigation.158 
For example, one of the criticisms levied against the CFPB is its use of 
enforcement staff at its examination meetings with banks, a practice which de-
parts from other similar agencies.159  By using these sorts of aggressive tactics, 
the agency appears to desire compliance at the expense of nuance in finding 
the appropriate solution.  This is a predictable outcome given Hyman and Ko-
vacic’s observation that “[e]nforcement involves selective, ex post intervention 
and the identification of wrongdoers.”160  The result is a “chilling effect” on 
targets of inquiry that inevitably leads to a reduction in crucial information that 
would identify appropriate policies.  Surely such an outcome does not serve all 
consumers, and it is easy to argue that it constitutes a far departure from the 
framework developed by Thaler and Sunstein.161  But as Hyman and Kovacic 
describe, “Repeated exposure to business misconduct, coupled with a mandate 
to attack apparent episodes of illegal behavior aggressively, could easily lead 
CFPB personnel to develop a ‘shoot first, ask questions later’ approach to en-
forcing Dodd-Frank.”162  
The CFPB also collects information from consumers directly by allowing 
credit customers to post comments about banks to its website.  Hence, this in-
formation is not collected through random survey but through self-identified 
credit consumers, which of course leads to a number of selection biases.  Critics 
have argued that this information should be better categorized by the agency to 
avoid presumptions of guilt.163  
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of auto lending described above, the CFPB determined bias based upon a controversial 
method that assigned the most likely ethnic background of the customer according to 
his or her last name.  See Yuka Hayashi & AnnaMaria Andriotis, CFPB Head Defends 
Regulator’s Work Before Lawmakers, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2015, 6:41 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-head-defends-regulators-work-before-lawmakers-
1443566473.  So, for example, names like Johnson, Williams, or Robinson indicated 
that the customer was African-American, at least according to the employed method-
ology.  Id. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Boettke et al. explain that the behavioral movement resembles previous 
episodes in the history of economic thought that sought to change market out-
comes based upon a perceived deviation from a theoretical optimum.164  As 
they explain, though, deviation does not condone intervention, at least not until 
greater understanding of market coordination and the political institutions by 
which such policy would be rendered is given.  And as Berggren notes, the 
acknowledgment of crucial political institutions in behavioral economics is 
sorely lacking.  Until this lacuna is filled, policy prescription is ultimately un-
convincing and premature.165 
While this Article does not fully address this shortcoming, it does provide 
a framework for those who wish to utilize behavioral insights in a way that 
accounts for the public choice architecture by which these ideas will ultimately 
be turned into policy outcomes.  Those seeking to use behavioral insights to 
achieve specific policy outcomes should incorporate not only behavioral eco-
nomics but also public choice, new institutional economics, and even market 
design theory.  The chief contribution of this last aspect is to learn from error 
in order to better anticipate how policies may fail to achieve the desired results.  
A more experimental approach, as is employed by the BIT, is surely warranted 
while this research program is in its formative stage, as market design can en-
hance and complement the use of behavioral insights.  Far from invalidating 
the approach, careful institutional analysis can provide behavioral economics 
with a platform to move forward as a progressive research program. 
Nevertheless, there is much to do before behavioral insights can become 
widely adopted to attain favorable policy.  The Nudge movement is a telling 
example of this claim.  While the ideas propounded by Thaler and Sunstein are 
compelling, their adoption by different agencies has shown remarkably diver-
gent results.  While the BIT has worked alongside government agencies and 
market actors to produce efficient outcomes, the CFPB has shown a far less 
nuanced – and potentially unconstitutional – approach that relies more on in-
timidating firms into choices that regulators unilaterally deem appropriate, with 
less regard to an ultimate set of choices left before the consumer.  As Mannix 
and Dudley maintain, the improvement of “‘choice architecture’ cannot pro-
duce benefits by destroying choice.”166 
The more general lesson is that without the proper public choice architec-
ture in place, there is little hope for improving private choices in practice.  
These insights are especially important as the United States adopts its own ver-
sion of the Behavioural Insights Team.  Led by Maya Shankar, an Oxford 
alumna with behavioral credentials, this initiative looks to duplicate much of 
 
 164. Boettke, Caceres & Martin, supra note 12, at 90–110. 
 165. Berggren, supra note 17, at 216. 
 166. Brian F. Mannix & Susan E. Dudley, The Limits of Irrationality as a Rationale 
for Regulation, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 705, 711 (2015). 
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the work of the BIT.167  Further, the executive order in September 2015 puts 
behavioral insights on the same footing as cost-benefit analysis in guiding reg-
ulatory policy.  The order stipulates that government “should design its policies 
and programs to reflect our best understanding of how people engage with, 
participate in, use, and respond to those policies and programs.”168 
In its inaugural year, this nascent group found itself in much the same 
institutional setting as the Behavioral Insights Team, with no real authority or 
power over other agencies.  In order to succeed in its mission, the team “fo-
cused on projects in two areas where behavioral science had a strong role to 
play and impacts could be demonstrated relatively rapidly: (1) streamlining ac-
cess to programs and (2) improving government efficiency.”169  Notably, the 
team also relied heavily on random control trials to best ascertain the effective-
ness of its proposals.170  The group has reported success in areas such as in-
creasing retirement savings and encouraging college enrollment, mostly by dis-
seminating information more effectively. 
While this group finds its feet, the most important work will be to better 
appreciate the public choice architecture in which behavioral policies will be 
rendered.  As I have shown by comparing the CFPB and BIT, institutions mat-
ter.  Indeed, getting the institutions right may be more important to the ultimate 
consumer than the ideas the policies are based upon.  Without proper under-
standing of context and the institutional constraints regulators will inevitably 
face, it is unlikely that behavioral ideas will lead to better private choice archi-
tecture.  While these efforts are encouraging for attempting to improve the 
choices people face, this paper exposes the importance of getting the institu-
tions right.  Those who truly wish to improve private choice architecture should 
take greater care in understanding the public choice architecture in which their 
theories are applied. 
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